When the Security State Stood Down Pt. 1
When the security state of the United States stands down, we see the change in our country’s priorities from social democracy towards militarism and authoritarianism. It has happened multiple times in our modern history from 1941–2021. This series will cover four such instances that are notable for the effects they’ve caused and the subsequent results.
Part 1: Attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7th, 1941)
The United States following the end of WW1 and the Great Depression was living as an isolationist society. Public opinion swayed heavily in favor of not involving ourselves in international conflicts in Europe and Asia, (even though we were expanding economically in South and Central America) and not entangling ourselves in international politics. Congress acted in favor of this opinion, by rejecting U.S. membership in the League of Nations following WW1 and repeatedly chose non-entanglement over participation or intervention as the appropriate response to international questions. In 1931, the Japanese invaded Manchuria. President Hoover’s Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, established the Stimson Doctrine, which stated that the United States would not recognize the territory gained by aggression and in violation of international agreements.
In 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who saw the necessity for the United States to play a more active role, couldn’t apply his personal outlook on foreign policy given the public opinion of isolationism. The 1934 publication of Merchants of Death by H. C. Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen followed by the 1935 track “War Is a Racket” by decorated Marine Corps General Smedly D. Butler served to increase this opinion in the direction of neutrality. Congress acted by pushing through a series of Neutrality Acts, which served to prevent American ships and citizens from becoming entangled in outside conflicts. Roosevelt, still requiring Congressional support for domestic New Deal policies, acquiesced reluctantly. Accepting isolationist elements in Congress until 1937, when he gave a speech likening international aggression to a disease that other nations must work to “quarantine.” Even the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 did not diffuse public sentiment to stay out of conflict, just shifted opinion from neutrality to supporting limited U.S. aid to allies. In 1940, the United States imposes trade sanctions, followed by an embargo, aimed at curbing Imperialist Japanese military aggression in Asia.
January 1941, Admiral Yamamoto begins communicating with other Japanese officers about an attack on Pearl Harbor, which the U.S. ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, learned of, and wired to Washington. Most senior military experts in Washington dismiss the warning and predict if war were to break out the attack would take place in Manila, Philippines.
February 1941, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel assumes command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, and Lt. General Walter C. Short, commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, prepares for the islands' defense.
April 1941, U.S. intelligence officers decode Japan’s diplomatic messages in a program code-named Magic. Washington does NOT communicate all available information to commands including Admiral Kimmel or Lt. Gen Short.
May 1941, Japanese Admiral Nomura informs his superiors that the Americans are reading his message traffic. Tokyo believes the code couldn’t have been broken, so the code doesn’t change. During the summer of 1941, Admiral Yamamoto trains his forces and finalizes the planning of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
On September 24th, 1941, the “bomb plot” message from Japanese naval intelligence to Japan’s consul general in Honolulu requesting a grid of exact locations of ships in Pearl Harbor is deciphered. The information is NOT shared with Hawaii’s commanders Adm. Kimmel or Gen. Short.
November 1941, under the guise of a diplomatic envoy to Washington, Tokyo launches submarines on the 16th and Admiral Yamamoto launches his main battle group of aircraft carriers and escorts on the 26th towards Hawaii. On November 27th, Admiral Kimmel and Lt. General Short receive a warning from Washington indicating a Japanese attack, possibly on an American target in the Pacific, is likely.
On the night of December 6th and the early hours of December 7th, U.S. intelligence decodes a message pointing to a Sunday morning deadline for “some kind of Japanese action.” The message is delivered to the Washington high command before 9 am Washington time, more than 4 hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor. But the message is NOT forwarded to Hawaiian commanders until after the attack had already begun.
On December 7th, 1941, at 0755 Hawaiian time, the first wave of Japanese aircraft began the attack on ships anchored at Pearl Harbor and air stations around the island of Oahu. The attack continues for two hours and 20 minutes. Casualties following this attack totaled 2400 dead, 1200 wounded, 18 ships damaged or sank, and more than 300 aircraft destroyed.
On December 8th, President Roosevelt addresses Congress and calls for a declaration of war against Japan, he receives it. On December 16th, Admiral Kimmel and Lt. General Short are relieved of their commands. The Roberts Commission (1942) found both officers guilty of dereliction of duty and solely responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster. It would be another 58 years before their names would be cleared and their ranks restored.
It can be theorized that nothing would have prevented an attack by the Japanese. Admiral Yamamoto had been planning the attack for an entire year and had he sent his 3rd wave; it is more likely he would have taken Hawaii completely. What could have been prevented is the loss of life to the extent of what it was. Washington decided to sit on the information when it mattered, allowing an attack to go forward on their own citizens, to ensure interventionism would be popular over isolationism.
A course change in the American way of life followed the attack, the United States recovered its military after 6 months, Japanese internment camps were built and the beginnings of what is called the Military-Industrial Complex were established. President Roosevelt’s plan for the 2nd Bill of Rights would never be fulfilled as he wouldn’t live to see the end of his fourth term in office. Vice President Harry Truman would take over a system he wasn’t privy to, with no knowledge over the Manhattan Project, and no real leadership backing him other than corporate interests. He unnecessarily nuked Japan twice, formed the CIA, and established The Truman Doctrine: outlined the moral and economic stake the United States had in fighting communism abroad, “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures… free people of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.”
Had Washington forwarded the information they received to the Hawaiian commanders in time, they could have been ready, and not surprised. They could have defended themselves better, had pilots ready in the sky, had personnel geared up and aware, had med stations ready and anti-air guns loaded. The damage would not have been as great, but the anger and subsequent intervention would still be unavoidable. Still, this is but the tamest example of when the security state stood down. For better, we helped end WW2, but for worse, we gave birth to a new war that wouldn’t end until 1990.
